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Abstract: This paper seeks to set the practical discipline of public interest intellectual property (IP) management in public 
health into its broader policy context. The most immediate and direct impact of IP systems on public welfare results not 
from international standards nor from national legislation – though these norms are fundamentally important - but rather 
from the accumulated impact of numerous practical choices whether or not to seek IP protection; where and where not; 
and how any exclusive rights are deployed, by whom, and to what end. IP management is the essentially practical exercise 
of limited exclusive rights over protected subject matter, the judicious use of those rights to leverage outcomes that 
advance an institution's or a firm's objectives. Exclusive rights are used to construct and define knowledge-based 
relationships, to leverage access to technology and other necessary resources, and to enhance market-based incentives. IP 
management choices range across a broad spectrum, spanning public domain strategies, open or exclusive licensing, and 
strong exclusivity. The idea of ‘exclusive rights’, as a specific legal mechanism, can run counter to expectations of greater 
openness and accessibility, but actual outcomes will depend very much on how these mechanisms are used in practice. 
For public interest or public sector institutions concerned with health research and development, particularly the 
development of new medicines, IP management choices can be just as critical as they are for private firms, although a 
predominant institutional concentration on advancing direct public interest objectives may lead to significantly different 
approaches in weighing and exercising practical choices for IP management: even so, a private sector approach should not 
be conflated with exclusivity as an end in itself, nor need public interest IP management eschew all leverage over IP. This 
paper offers a tentative framework for a richer typology of those choices, to give a sense of practical options available and 
the factors that might guide their application, but without advocating any particular approach. 
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[Asclepius] freed of their misery, each from his ailment, and 
led them forth- some to the lull of soft spells, others by 
potions, still others with bandages steeped in medications 
culled from all quarters, and some he set right through 
surgery. But even wisdom feels the lure of gain- gold 
glittered in his hand, and he was hired to retrieve from death 
a man already forfeit: the son of Kronos [Zeus] hurled and 
drove the breath, smoking, from both their chests-savior and 
saved alike speared by the lightning flash [1]. 
Asclepius … introduced medical treatment for those who have a 
good constitution and lead a healthy life … and prescribed for 
them their customary regimen in order not to interfere with 
their civic duties … But if a man was incapable of living in the 
established round and order of life, he did not think it worth 
while to treat him, since such a fellow is of no use either to 
himself or to the state. Plato, The Republic, 407 c-e. 
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INTRODUCTION 
  Pindar recounts how the mythical pioneer of medical 
practice, Asclepius, was ‘struck off’ in an extreme fashion – 
by Zeus’s thunderbolt – for placing love of gold above a 
more selfless rationing of his medical skills. He was 
condemned for ‘playing god,’ presuming to confront the 
mysteries of mortality through intemperate, hubristic 
advances in medical knowledge – a charge with resonances 
for today’s medical researchers as they probe the essence of 
human genetic identity. And Plato’s unflinching utilitarian 
analysis of Asclepius’s clinical case management shows how 
ancient societies were confronted with tough choices about 
allocating scarce medical resources. These accounts of the 
archetypal medical practitioner illuminate a timeless 
dilemma: should medical resources go to those who can pay 
for them, to those who are most ‘entitled’ to them in some 
principled sense, or to those who will be most beneficial for 
society? These profound ethical questions - about fairness 
and social utility in the allocation of that most fundamental 
of medical resources, knowledge - remain unresolved today. 
  A ‘right to health’ (or more strictly a ‘right to the highest 
attainable standard of health’) is acknowledged as a 
fundamental and universal human right
1, established within 
                                                 
1Article 25 (1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for 
the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, Intellectual Property Management for Public Health Innovation and Access  The Open AIDS Journal, 2010, Volume 4    5 
binding international law
2 and elaborated through guidelines 
on its implementation [2]. Equitable access to medication is 
highlighted as a particular aspect of this right [3]; access to 
medicines is not a stand-alone human right in itself, but is 
plainly instrumental to assuring the highest attainable 
standard of health. The General Comment on the 
International Covenant accordingly recognizes as a ‘core 
obligation’ on States parties to “provide essential drugs, as 
from time to time defined under the WHO Action 
Programme on Essential Drugs.” 
  But disease is not static and is unequally distributed, and 
medicines are not simple commodities like clean water, in 
the sense that water has essentially the same utility for all 
humanity. In medicine, innovative activity that benefits some 
populations may be little or no use to others which may be in 
greater need of life-saving medicines: thus, equitable and 
effective access to medicines arguably entails a fair 
distribution of the innovation effort, too, so that research and 
development must not be inequitably focused on the health 
needs of the wealthy, and must track and respond to the 
changing clinical environment and infrastructure needs of 
the poor; equally, making drugs available in the absence of 
broader clinical support can be ineffective, or in some cases 
actively counter-productive.
3 A comprehensive and realistic 
view of access to medication must, therefore, take account of 
the innovation process itself and broader infrastructure 
needs. It cannot focus solely on distributive equity in the 
allocation of finished pharmaceutical products. Hence the 
international debate over a right to health and access to 
medicines has broadened to a full-fledged policy process 
about innovation to address neglected health needs.
4 
                                                                                  
clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services … 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly (A/RES/217, December 10, 1948); also relevant are 
Articles 27 and 17. 
2International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 
and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly 
resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 (entry into force 3 January 
1976) (‘the International Covenant’). Article 12 provides: 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to 
the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health. 
The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to 
achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for: 
(a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant 
mortality and for the healthy development of the child; 
(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene; 
(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, 
occupational and other diseases; 
(d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and 
medical attention in the event of sickness. 
3Clinical mismanagement of tuberculosis, for instance, can promote the 
development of drug-resistant strains, as epitomized by reports that 
extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB) resulted from 
mismanagement of multidrug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB), see World 
Health Organization, Drug- and multidrug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB), 
at http://www.who.int/tb/challenges/mdr/en/index.html, and Global 
tuberculosis control - epidemiology, strategy, financing, WHO Report 2009, 
WHO/HTM/TB/2009.411, 2009. 
4See, for instance, the work of the Commission on Intellectual Property 
Rights, Innovation and Public Health (CIPIH), established by the World 
Health Assembly in 2003 “…to collect data and proposals from the different 
actors involved and produce an analysis of intellectual property rights, 
innovation, and public health, including the question of appropriate funding 
SCARCITY OF RESOURCES & UNIVERSALITY OF 
ACCESS 
  The challenge of implementing a universal right to health 
is that, in practice, it entails the allocation of medical 
resources that are inherently scarce and necessarily rivalrous 
(by contrast, enjoying freedom of speech does not deny 
others that right), and modern medicine is increasingly 
resource-intensive (by contrast, the technological 
infrastructure required effectively to exercise freedom of 
expression is falling in relative cost). Rationing medical 
resources to fulfil a universal right to health is problematic 
whether the resources in question essentially concern direct 
patient care (e.g. skilled medical workers), the environment 
that sustains health (medical infrastructure, medications, and 
broader needs such as the availability of safe drinking 
water), or those applied to researching and developing new 
medical treatments (research capacity, financial and human 
capital, research and development infrastructure, and 
developmental, clinical and regulatory capacity). A further, 
fundamental - from some perspectives, controlling - factor is 
that for the most part society has, by default, largely chosen 
to leave the intermediate and final stages of development of 
new pharmaceutical products to the private sector; while 
other models for drug discovery and development are 
actively explored, there are few examples of new 
medications that have been developed into finished, effective 
and clinically-proven products solely through public sector 
institutions, without the involvement of at least some private 
sector resources along the development pipeline, so that in 
practical drug development public interest and public 
resources are intrinsically mixed with private interests and 
private resources. Some commentators respond to this status 
quo by calling for more active and better resourced public 
sector programs of new product development, for stepped up 
public funding and control of the full research and 
development pipeline, and for alternative innovation 
structures that decouple the economics of drug development 
from the market for finished products. 
  No view is advanced in this paper on the legitimacy or 
the relative efficiency and equity of any existing or potential 
future models, a broader policy debate not touched upon 
here. But, for the immediate present, one must address the 
current state of affairs - a complex interplay of public and 
private interests - in considering how practically to promote 
universal, equitable access to medications. To the extent that 
it is the private sector that brings new medications to the 
dispensary, firms can be expected to allocate their resources 
so as to promote their commercial interests, given that 
company management is under a fiduciary duty to do so. 
And if public sector institutions need to cooperate with firms 
can engage private sector resources to yield public health 
outcomes in practice, then these institutions will need to 
                                                                                  
and incentive mechanisms for the creation of new medicines and other 
products against diseases that disproportionately affect developing 
countries…” and the ensuing Intergovernmental Working Group (IGWG) 
established under Resolution WHA59.24 to draw up a global strategy and 
plan of action aimed at, inter alia, securing an enhanced and sustainable 
basis for needs-driven, essential health research and development relevant to 
diseases that disproportionately affect developing countries. 6    The Open AIDS Journal, 2010, Volume 4  Antony Taubman 
acknowledge and accommodate legitimate commercial 
motives - the same “lure of gain” [4]. But need these distinct 
interests be set permanently or intrinsically at odds with one 
another, in an essentially zero-sum analysis? Or is it 
analytically and practically more productive to work from 
the assumption that these two sets of interests (to the extent 
that they can be coherently clumped together at all) can not 
only be reconciled, but indeed may be mutually dependent 
and potentially synergetic in a mixed market economy? It is 
that goal – the conscious construction of non-zero-sum forms 
of working with biomedical knowledge that can advance 
legitimate private interests while focusing on attaining public 
health interests – that some strategies for public-interest IP 
management in the field of health work towards. 
  Given this backdrop of scarcity, and rivalry over 
resources, it is unsurprising that some proponents of a right 
to health view the IP
5 system as being inherently at odds 
with attaining universal access to appropriate health care, or 
at least discern deep conceptual tension between the right to 
health and the rights attached to IP, requiring the active 
intervention of governments [5], a conscious process of 
reconciliation between different normative goals, or the 
assertion of the primacy of fundamental human rights over 
the more contingent, utilitarian rights granted under an IP 
law. The central legal logic of an IP law system is that it sets 
out rights to exclude third parties – rights to say 'no', or to set 
conditions, for others' use of certain protected material - in 
other words, it creates exclusions from the public domain.
6 
                                                 
5Two distinctions may be helpful in guiding discussion: first, between IP 
and patents as such; second, between IP and an IP ‘right’ or between a 
patent and a patent ‘right’. On the first, ‘IP’ can at times serve in discussion 
as a metonym for patents (or a synecdoche, using the genus to denote the 
species) in the public health and human rights debate, at times misleadingly 
so. The most conspicuous instance of this conflation is TRIPS art.  [7], 
which appears - despite its authoritative articulation of the objectives of IP 
protection – to be focused, through its references to ‘the promotion of 
technological innovation,’ ‘the transfer and dissemination of technology’ 
and ‘producers and users of technological knowledge’ to more on patents 
(and to a lesser extent undisclosed information and test data, designs and the 
technological dimension of copyright), than on the full sweep of ‘IP’ 
(embracing, for instance, geographical indications, trademarks and the 
aesthetic dimension of artistic works). On the second, the conventional 
conflation between, say, a patent, and a ‘patent right’ may lead to a loss of 
information, just as my ownership of a plot of land cannot be conflated with 
the ensuing rights to exclude others from that land: grant of a patent carries 
with it certain rights to exclude third parties from certain actions, and critics 
of the patent system may object to the reification of a patent as a form of 
property in itself, but there is nonetheless a key operational distinction – 
crucial to this article – between the fact that I am registered as owning a 
patent, and the limited rights to object to third parties’ activities that result 
from my ownership of the patent: once again, TRIPS is an illustrative case 
study, focused as it is more on the ‘rights’ associated with IP than it is with 
IP as such (TRIPS is in general silent on questions of ownership and 
assignment of IP, a point reinforced in the Appellate Body Report, United 
States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, 
WT/DS176/AB/R, adopted 1 February 2002, DSR 2002:II, 589). The panel 
decision in Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, 
WT/DS114/R, adopted 7 April 2000, DSR 2000:V, 2289 clarified that there 
was no ‘hierarchy of patent rights’ within TRIPS: ‘ [i]f the right to exclude 
sales were all that really mattered, there would be no reason to add other 
rights to exclude "making" and "using". The fact that such rights were 
included in [TRIPS], as they are in most national patent laws, is strong 
evidence that they are considered a meaningful and independent part of the 
patent owner's rights’ (at p. 156). 
6A broader reading of IP law includes mechanisms that do not create a right 
to exclude as such, but enable a claim for equitable remuneration, a right to 
Typically, given the concentration of patent ownership in the 
commercial sector, the right to exclude others from the 
material protected by patents is normally exercised so as to 
promote a firm’s or an individual’s own commercial 
interests: “the normal practice of exploitation by patent 
owners, as with owners of any other intellectual property 
right, is to exclude all forms of competition that could 
detract significantly from the economic returns anticipated 
from a patent's grant of market exclusivity” [6]. The law of 
human rights does recognize a ‘right to protection of the 
moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, 
literary or artistic production of which one is the author’ [8]; 
this human right is potentially promoted by (but should not 
be conflated with) the rights flowing from tenure of IP. 
Authoritative commentary stresses that this human right is 
itself subject to ‘limitations in the public interest’ [8], setting 
this particular right into a utilitarian context. 
  Thus, at first blush, it is assumed that the IP system is 
predisposed towards the kind of mercenary approach that 
provoked the ire of Zeus, and the capital punishment of 
Asclepius: rationing scarce healing capacity according to 
ability to pay. In a public health environment already 
hampered by scarcity, what is the policy logic of promoting 
a legal mechanism that can only work by imposing 
exclusion, exclusion from the use of that very medical 
knowledge that is desperately needed to promote public 
health, thus fulfilling the hope for equitable public health 
outcomes for all? This normative tension is articulated at the 
level of formal international policy discourse: “since the 
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement does not 
adequately reflect the fundamental nature and individuality 
of all human rights, including the right of everyone to enjoy 
the benefits of scientific progress and its applications, the 
right to health, the right to food and the right to self-
determination, there are apparent conflicts between the 
intellectual property rights regime embodied in the TRIPS 
Agreement, on the one hand, and international human rights 
law, on the other [9].” 
METHODOLOGY OF THIS ARTICLE 
  This article explores these policy dilemmas and ‘apparent 
conflicts’, with a view to elaborating the potential functional 
role of IP mechanisms,
7 particularly the practical exercise of 
patents, in promoting public policy outcomes in the field of 
human health, in line with the “right to health” of human 
right law. This article does not focus on the substantive 
elements of human rights law, nor on international and 
national patent laws and standards - patentability, exceptions 
and limitations, compulsory licensing, etc. - that have 
recently preoccupied international policymakers and much 
                                                                                  
be acknowledged, and a right to object to certain objectionable forms of use 
(including distorting or derogatory uses, or unfair competition); the general 
point here is that overall the 'right' granted under an IP system is normally a 
right to exclude in its essential legal character. 
7The paper concentrates on the patent system as a crude proxy for IP 
mechanisms more generally, to some extent making the conflation noted 
above (note 5); a full review would need at the very least to address cognate 
areas of law, such as test data protection and knowhow/trade secrets, as well 
as other forms of IP such as the role of trademarks in enabling humanitarian 
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policy debate. The approach taken is firstly to review the 
general context of IP policymaking, and then to highlight the 
impact of specific choices undertaken within the framework 
of the patent system. This is not to suggest for a moment that 
this focus is comprehensive or sufficient in itself; this 
approach merely supplements and may inform a more 
comprehensive account of the patent system and its 
implications for the right to health, and certainly does not 
substitute for such a wide-ranging analysis. This 
supplementary approach may nonetheless be useful since the 
ultimate actual impact of the patent system is felt not from 
the mere presence or absence of a formal system of 
assessing, granting, and enforcing patents, but from the 
judicious, skillful application and regulation of these legal 
mechanisms in practice. Overall positive welfare gains for 
public health that may flow from the patent system would 
emerge from an accumulation of individual practical choices 
to apply for and to deploy specific IP rights, not solely from 
the relatively abstract process of shaping the legislative 
framework within which rights are deployed. Equally, 
tangible harms that are actually felt in practice would result 
also from particular choices about how individual IP rights 
are exercised in practice, and not directly from the passage of 
stronger or weaker patent legislation, nor immediately from 
the decision to grant or refuse a patent on an application 
(again, this is not to suggest that these broader factors are not 
fundamentally important - it is just to recall the significance 
of accumulated choices concerning the practical exercise of 
any patent rights once granted). Accordingly, this article 
considers the practical role of patents when actively, directly 
implemented with the explicit goal of promoting positive 
public health outcomes. In short, it considers how the 
exclusive  rights established under IP law are, can be, or 
should be, deployed to achieve the inclusive  goal of 
universal access to necessary health care. 
  This article therefore develops the concept of public-
interest or public-sector IP management, concentrating on 
the management of IP directly to leverage public health 
outcomes. It forms part of a broader body of analytical work 
that seeks to address: 
•  the policy background to public-sector IP 
management, and how to reconcile the apparent 
contradiction between the exercise of exclusive rights 
and the promotion of public health outcomes; 
•  the elements of a distinct discipline of public interest 
IP management, considering them from both the 
normative and the practical aspects, distinguished 
from the regular, commercially-oriented management 
of IP; 
•  policy lessons that may be derived from the practice 
of public-interest IP management, that may apply to 
the broader management and regulation of knowledge 
in the public interest. 
  Framing these questions in this way is not intended to 
suggest that the management of patents by private concerns 
to promote the legitimate commercial interests of firms is 
inherently  at odds with the public interest. According to 
conventional analyses, the patent system serves a valuable 
role in harnessing and focusing private interest towards 
broader, socially beneficial outcomes, that may not be 
achieved without, to use the stock phrase coined by Lincoln, 
“the fuel of interest” [10]. Indeed, the very basis of the 
patent system is the consistent determination over many 
years by policymakers that the public interest is actively 
served by yoking private interest and directing it towards 
welfare-enhancing innovation: “the discovery and 
production of new and useful things [10].” 
  Proponents of the patent system typically stress that it 
provides private actors with a rational incentive to invest in 
socially valuable research and development. But when it 
comes to delivering the benefit of innovation, private 
incentive is often viewed as conflicting with the public’s 
need for optimal access to new technologies. The logic of IP 
rights is to exclude: creating a private right to deny or limit 
to third parties the use of what is protected. This creates a 
seeming paradox: a policy tool that is meant to promote 
public welfare in new technologies operates by excluding 
access to those technologies. 
POLICY BACKGROUND 
  Squaring this circle has been a continuing legal and 
policy challenge from the early days of the patent system: 
how to stimulate beneficial innovation by private players, 
while ensuring the public enjoys tangible benefits, or 
‘innovation and access’,
8 as it is currently expressed.
9 Public 
and private domains of knowledge have evolved over time in 
a contested, dynamic search for the right balance, not as a 
static zero-sum tradeoff but through positive sum synergies. 
Anglo-American patent law draws its roots from a Jacobean 
text, the 1623 Statute of Monopolies
10, which aimed to 
eliminate harmful monopolies based ‘upon misinformations 
and untrue pretences of public good.’ From this pro-
competition standard (supporting also the right to ply one's 
trade without undue restraint), legislators consciously carved 
out an exception for legitimate patents of inventions. This 
provision, in effect an early patent law, reflected a practical 
judgement that such exclusive rights could serve public and 
private interests in conjunction, and that immediate open 
public access for all inventions would have the effect of 
impairing the public interest. That paradox again: limited 
exclusion as a public good. 
  Following this approach, the task of an utilitarian and 
objective IP policymaker boils down to determining what 
privately-held exclusions from the public domain of 
otherwise non-excludable knowledge resources are required 
to harness sufficient private interest to provide for the 
production of useful public goods that would not otherwise 
                                                 
8See, e.g. Médecins sans frontières, Twin problems, one solution: tackling 
innovation and access together, at www.accessmed-msf.org/main/access-
patents, and KEI, Medical Innovation and Access, at http://www.keionline. 
org 
9See also Innovation and Access to Knowledge Programme, South Centre, 
at http://www.southcentre.org 
10Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, 8    The Open AIDS Journal, 2010, Volume 4  Antony Taubman 
come into existence.
11 But how does the objective 
policymaker, ideally in the original position behind a 
Rawlsian veil of ignorance [12], determine what exclusions 
would be just; or legitimate; or effective; how does the 
policymaker establish a hierarchy of public goods, say 
between the goods of a pragmatic effectiveness and formal 
equity? From this perspective, a possible utilitarian line of 
analysis would, in effect, adapt the classical liberal economic 
analysis (the ‘invisible hand’)
12 and apply it to the intangible 
goods generated by the IP system: public goods result from 
the pursuit of private interest, as the spontaneous ordering of 
the market and communication through market exchange 
promotes beneficial investment and innovation.
13 
  Classically applied to goods and services,
14 this analysis 
may extend to the harnessing of private interest to produce 
intangible knowledge products of benefit to society. By such 
an analysis, at least, certain exclusions from the public 
domain would capture and direct private interest towards the 
production of public goods that would otherwise not exist: 
paradoxically, a conscious system of exclusion from the 
public domain may provide for spontaneous ordering that 
works for society’s gain:
15 provisionally privatizing new 
knowledge through statutory exclusions may help convert 
abstract knowledge into tangible public goods. Yet, as soon 
as this analysis is articulated, it can be suspected as 
effectively defending exclusive rights as ends in themselves; 
other participants in the debate find it problematic to invest 
simple faith in the beneficial operation of private rights as 
spontaneously advancing the collective public interest, when 
                                                 
11This is not, of course, by any means the mechanism for harnessing private 
interest to provide for public goods. There is, for example, a considerable 
economic literature on the private provision of public goods, considering 
such phenomena as corporate philanthropy, political campaign donations. 
See Eduardo Ley, ‘On the Private Provision of Public Goods: A Diagram-
matic Exposition,’ Investigaciones Economicas, 20:1 (January 1996), 105–
123, at IMF, Washington DC, http://econwpa.wustl.edu/eprints/pe/papers/ 
9503/9503001.abs. See the economic model for non-cooperative provision 
of public goods in Theodore Bergstrom, Laurence Blume, and Hal Varian, 
Private Provision of Public Goods, Journal of Public Economics, 29:25-49 
1986. at http://econwpa.wustl.edu/eprints/pe/papers/9503/9503001.abs 
12For a brief historical review of these aspects of liberalism, see Steven 
Horwitz, From Smith to Menger to Hayek: Liberalism in the Spontaneous 
Order Tradition, The Indep. Rev., 6 (1), Summer 2001), at 81. 
13Compare Adam Smith’s classic formulation: “by directing that industry in 
such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only 
his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible 
hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always 
the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own 
interest, he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than 
when he really intends to promote it.” 
14With the assumption that intangible knowledge products are not 
economically significant: note Smith’s reference to the intangible or 
ephemeral product of “players, opera-singers, opera-dancers, etc.” as 
producing “nothing which could afterwards purchase or procure an equal 
quantity of labour. Like the declamation of the actor, the harangue of the 
orator, or the tune of the musician, the work of all of them perishes in the 
very instant of its production.” Adam Smith, An Inquiry into The Nature 
and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 119 (Henry Frowde ed., Oxford Univ. 
Press 1909) (1776). 
15The imposition of an exclusion means that they cease to be true public 
goods, as these are by definition not excludable, but the disclosure 
requirements of technology-related IP protection are intended to ensure that 
protected subject matter passes into the public domain firstly as a public 
knowledge good (patent information is not, in principle, excludable from the 
time of its publication), and, through limited term. 
the policy tool applied is one of exclusion: intuitively, at 
least, it can go against the grain for a policy aimed at 
providing for public goods (which are by definition not 
excludable) to operate through the exercise of exclusive 
rights. In principle, the tension may be resolved through 
some key distinctions. First, if the desired public good is 
available knowledge as such - material in the public domain 
of knowable information - then the function of the patent 
system is to deliver technological teaching into that form of 
public domain; new knowledge must be published and 
publicly available for a valid patent to be granted. Second, if 
the ultimate objective is the production of tangible public 
goods, then the protected innovation is in itself only an 
intermediate towards that end – knowledge about therapeutic 
properties of a new compound is not the same thing as the 
provision of a concrete, safe, effective and stable product in 
the pharmacopoeia and stocked by dispensaries worldwide. 
Equally, the ‘right to health’ – the entitlement to receive a 
certain standard of medical treatment – is not the same thing 
as the right to make commercial use of a particular form of 
pharmacological know-how. In practice, as noted, society 
has often elected to use market-based mechanisms for 
funding the final practical development of new medications. 
Leaving aside the broader question of whether this was the 
optimal choice, it offers empirical evidence that exclusive 
rights, properly defined and regulated, can serve as at least 
one means of financing and furnishing socially valuable 
public goods. 
  Even so, there is a history of concern that policy tools 
that rely on exclusive rights may be subject to excessive 
influence by sectoral interests and regulatory capture. 
Principled resistance has long been asserted against 
economic privileges and the kind of special pleading that 
their beneficiaries can use to justify them. Commenting on 
the mercantilist tendency to grant monopolies in the early 
industrial age, when patent law was being gradually distilled 
out of the general law of monopolies as a legitimate 
exception, Marshall observes that “restrictive regulations, 
which have an indirect constructive result in promoting 
national power and dignity, are rightly judged with 
exceptional favour. But this fine feeling is not without its 
perils; for it is apt to be turned to account by persons who 
stand to gain by the restrictions. Such persons are most 
dangerous when they are honestly convinced, as they often 
are, that they are striving for the public good as well as their 
own [13].” He refers to “sectional jealousies” provoked by 
monopolies that enabled the suppression of “inconvenient 
rivals.”
16 This tendency to special pleading underscores the 
need for objective principles to determine the utilitarian 
benefit of such restrictions, so that they become a genuine 
mechanism for social benefit and not a bare favour or 
sectional privilege. Substantive patent law provides a 
distillation of these public policy principles, and the 
continuing application of patentability criteria provides one 
public-interest safeguard against the simple accommodation 
of private interests. 
                                                 
16Ibid. amplifying, in a footnote, he comments “in some cases plausible 
reasons were suggested: and indeed the Tudors were masters of the fine art 
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  Perhaps this logic might hold together when society 
relies on private innovation to serve the public interest, if 
one moves away from a static, zero-sum view of innovation, 
and accepts that the public expects private investment to 
develop new technologies as finished products. But does this 
logic apply when the public pays for research? Shouldn’t 
fruits of that research enter the public domain, and not be 
shrouded in exclusivity? Traditionally, management of 
public research has taken this approach, effectively 
conflating the public domain and the public good. Yet the 
growing realization that this choice can - in practice, and in 
some specific circumstances - work against the public 
interest yields a fundamental insight into the nature of 
innovation in a market economy. Of course much research 
resides properly in the public domain: the human genome is 
an iconic instance.
17 Private interests also choose to defend 
their interests by pre-emptively placing some research in the 
public domain through defensive publication, in such cases 
regarding their continuing freedom to operate as being 
commercially more valuable than the right to exclude their 
competitors from using this information. 
  In practice, though, to apply public research insights and 
to transform them into practically available new technologies 
requires judicious use of a wider range of tools than reliance 
on public domain status. Eschewing exclusive rights 
altogether may mean that public research is available on the 
library shelf, but that there is no viable pathway for those 
who need to invest risk and resources into its practical 
employment and transformation into usable products. When 
concerns arise over the impact and effectiveness of public 
funding, it can mean that private foreign interests may 
benefit more from public-funded innovation, effectively 
free-riding on research, developing and applying it, and 
creating new products which are sold back to the originating 
country. Knowledge management solely through channeling 
research into the public domain can mean that others decide 
how the research outcomes are taken up, if at all, and who is 
to benefit, and that research sponsors lose any  say over now 
these outcomes. 
KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PUBLIC 
GOODS 
  At one level, knowledge is the definitive public good – 
like safe water and clean air. Yet given the practical 
dilemmas over effective management of public research, an 
appropriate system of knowledge governance and public 
innovation policy – systemic IP management to advance 
public welfare – is in itself a higher order public good; 
medical knowledge in itself is a public good, but a well 
ordered mechanism for managing that knowledge to advance 
                                                 
17Then British Prime Minister Tony Blair and then-U.S. President Bill Clinton on 
March 14, 2000 stated that “ [t]o realize the full promise of this research, raw 
fundamental data on the human genome, including the human DNA sequence 
and its variations, should be made freely available to scientists everywhere. 
Unencumbered access to this information will promote discoveries that will 
reduce the burden of disease, improve health around the world, and enhance the 
quality of life for all humankind. Intellectual property protection for gene-based 
inventions will also play an important role in stimulating the development of 
important new health care products.” (accessed at: http://clinton4.nara. 
gov/WH/EOP/OSTP/html/00314.html). 
actual public well-being may be considered a public good at 
a different plane of analysis. Public resources are invested in 
generating the public good of knowledge, but are equally 
invested in creating a knowledge management infrastructure 
(legal and administrative) that enables society to extract 
practical benefit from that knowledge. Hence shrewd, 
informed and objective use of exclusive IP rights is one 
element of the mix of policy measures to transform research 
insights into tangible public benefit. This entails recognizing 
where the public domain and the public interest diverge, and 
managing exclusive rights to focus resources on beneficial 
innovation and the optimal practical application of that 
innovation. 
  Indeed, actual patterns of innovation for public health – 
the life cycles of real products - confute a priori assumptions 
of a fundamental choice between private or public good 
structures, or between favouring the impetus of exclusive 
private rights or directly promoting the public interest. The 
plurality of approaches to ownership and control of patented 
technology increasingly illustrates the practical distinction 
between privately-held rights to exclude and private interests 
as such: a significant proportion of patenting activity in the 
public health domain is by government agencies, public 
institutions or other public-interest bodies. Accordingly, the 
grant and exercise of ‘private rights’
18 need not be solely or 
even marginally directed towards private interest: it is 
increasingly inaccurate to conflate the private or exclusive 
nature of IP rights with the narrow pursuit of private interest. 
IP management that is solely and explicitly directed towards 
promoting public interest outcomes can include defensive 
publication and the pre-emptive creation of a public domain 
(including by waiving IP rights
19), but it also includes the 
judicious deployment of legal exclusions. 
  For instance, the IP-based right to exclude certain uses of 
protected materials can be used to encourage direct 
allocation of private resources towards public interest 
outcomes, in the absence of market incentives: this is the 
essence of IP management in public-private partnerships. 
Exclusive rights can be licensed to preclude commercial use 
of protected materials, to promote non-commercial creative 
exchange and adaptation.
20 The judicious application of the 
right to exclude can be used to safeguard the open quality of 
a shared innovative domain for agricultural biotechnology 
(exercising exclusive IP rights to preclude third parties from 
                                                 
18Compare the preamble of the WTO TRIPS Agreement (‘Recognizing that 
intellectual property rights are private rights’) with the growing stock of 
publicly-held patents – private rights held and exercised nonetheless by 
public institutions, even government instrumentalities such as ministries of 
health. 
19See for example the public domain dedication of the Eldritch Press: “Eric 
Eldred hereby releases any creative addition to the literary materials at the 
Eldritch Press — including but not limited to any copyrightable compilation 
of materials or HTML formatting — to the public domain with a Creative 
Commons Public Domain Dedication.” (at http://creativecommons.org/ 
licenses/publicdomain/eldred/) 
20See for example the ‘Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 1.0’ draft 
license at (UK) : “ You may not exercise any of the rights granted to You in 
Section 3 above in any manner that is primarily intended for or directed 
towards commercial advantage or monetary compensation.” (at 
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excluding open access to derivative technologies).
21 
Standards bodies use IP licensing structures to ensure open 
access to standards while encouraging technology developers 
to pool their technologies for mutual benefit, such as by 
defining fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) 
terms and conditions for licenses.
22 The claim for protection 
of traditional knowledge is expressed by some proponents, at 
least, as a collective right or custodial responsibility to 
prevent illegitimate use of this knowledge, entailing the 
                                                 
21See for example Biological Open Source License for Genetic Resources 
Indexing Technologies at http://www.bios.net/daisy/GRITLicense/750/1170. 
html 
22Concerning the resolution of conflict between the exclusivity of IP rights 
and open access to standards in the United Kingdom, “most standards 
bodies include procedures that take IPRs into account where a standard is in 
the process of being drawn up. Each participant is expected to declare at an 
early stage the IPRs it holds which are (or might be) essential to the draft 
standard if it were to be adopted. The owner is requested to give an 
undertaking in writing that it is prepared to grant irrevocable licences on 
royalty-free or fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms and 
conditions under such IPRs, with a waiver of copyright in documentary 
material. The standards body also makes sure that the patent in question is 
endorsed as a ‘Licence of Right’ at the Patent Office. This ensures that 
licences under the patent are available to all applicants as of right and that 
any disagreement of licensing terms is subject to settlement by the Patent 
Office,” Matthew Clarke, Standards and Intellectual Property Rights (2004), 
at 64. 
exercise of rights to exclude third parties in the name of a 
public if not the  public – i.e. the traditional community 
which maintains the knowledge according to customary law 
and practice [14]. Programs of public sector knowledge 
management that entail obtaining and asserting IP rights can 
be construed as a form of privatisation of public knowledge, 
or idealized as a means to maintain collective public-interest 
control over how public knowledge is developed and 
applied. 
HEALTH INNOVATION STRUCTURES IN PRACTICE 
  Innovation practices and structures developed to deliver 
public health outcomes typically do not correspond 
absolutely to one or other of the conventional antinomies of 
public vs private, or exclusive rights vs open innovation; just 
as the values driving innovation are more protean than a neat 
cleavage between open altruism and closed self-interest. 
Actual development and effective delivery to the public of 
life sciences products employ a blend of public, private but 
part publicly-funded, and strictly private inputs, with 
emphasis varying as to the preferred end of a diverse 
spectrum of inputs and structures. There is rarely a one-to-
one correspondence between one patent, or one licensing 
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Fig. (1). Mapping the options for drug innovation structures according to the degree of market engagement to provide incentive to bring the 
product through the development pipeline and the degree to which exclusivity or leverage is exercised over the core technologies.  This 
Figure is potentially useful only as an illustration of the range of possibilities and practical design issues in shaping a strategy and is not a 
precise analytical tool;  actual choices vary more considerably – for example, some public private partnerships entail complete non-
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complex product such as a new drug or vaccine, which in its 
available and functional form will be a convergence of 
inputs: genetic material, knowhow, foreground inventions, 
platform technologies and test data. The necessary cluster of 
diverse technological inputs will be governed, licensed and 
made available in diverse ways ultimately to yield a practical 
product that draws together elements of each of these inputs. 
This makes it almost inevitable that a hybrid mix of forms of 
knowledge management will be employed along the full, 
extended pipeline of actual product development. As the 
above figure (Fig. 1) illustrates, innovation structures make 
use of a range of options between fully open access and 
exclusivity, on one axis, and between different levels of 
engagement with the market on the other axis. The 
knowledge management task for the product innovator – 
whether public or private, or both – entails determining what 
position on this landscape is likely to achieve the practical 
outcomes desired, recognizing that at least some leverage 
over technology and some engagement with the market will 
likely be required. For the public-sector or public-interest 
knowledge manager, there will be a special responsibility to 
ensure that engagement with market dynamics and the 
exercise of exclusive leverage do not become ends in 
themselves, but remain strictly instrumental towards the 
overarching goals of the innovation project. 
  A bare dichotomy between public and private forms of 
management is likely to be insufficient to describe actual 
patterns of behavior, or to guide future practical choices. A 
more comprehensive working typology of these innovation 
structures and mechanisms may, therefore, be constructed on 
the basis of different choices along the two axes of 
public/private resources engaged, and the degree of 
exclusivity or openness employed. A further factor that may 
inform such a typology is the manner in which the 'fuel of 
interest' is ignited – in other words, the incentive mechanism 
that is used to engage and direct any necessary private 
resources (including financial, capital and intellectual 
resources, but also the capacity of the private sector to 
manage risk and liability). The potential range of incentive 
mechanisms can be characterized, again, by the extent of 
reliance on the market as against direct grants or prizes, and 
the extent to which exclusivity is employed as an incentive. 
Thus the range of incentive options includes the 
conventional incentive of potential participation in the 
market based on defined exclusive rights over a technology 
or over a regulatory approval dossier, and transferred 
incentives in which interests based on a certain technology 
or a defined market are used to promote a guaranteed level of 
support for a neglected technology or patient group – such as 
using exclusivity in a wealthy market to subsidize access and 
distribution in a developing country, or a public 
sector/philanthropic market; or using a larger market to cross 
subsidize readiness for another area of need (such as 
paediatric formulations); or using exclusive rights over 
adaptive or secondary use technologies (when these are 
genuine inventions) to enable the development of an existing 
treatment for other defined needs. The options also include 
prize funds and direct grants for research, which may aim at 
creating strong incentives for innovation and investment in 
risky research, while not requiring the prospect of future 
exclusive rights to serve as the principal incentive – as it is 
presented in current debate, delinking the market for 
innovation from the market for pharmaceuticals. 
  IP management is in principle technology-neutral; the 
same basic legal tools apply where the technology concerns 
public health or new construction techniques. However there 
are several fundamental considerations that set apart the life 
sciences, and medical technology especially, which may 
influence the choice of IP management strategy and 
techniques. 
•  These technologies are closely associated with human 
rights and fundamental human needs concerning 
health. 
•  Medical technology attracts a higher than usual share 
of public or philanthropic funding, and other public 
resources (such as research facilities). 
•  There are high expectations that the benefits from 
new technologies will flow directly to the public. 
•  Ethical considerations may apply, bolstered by the 
human rights dimension, such as the ethical 
implications of too restrictive an approach to granting 
access to key technologies; 
•  pharmaceuticals are developed and exercised within a 
complex regulatory environment, to ensure safety and 
efficacy; this can mean that the dynamics, required 
resources and incentive structures for the 
development and dissemination of new technologies 
can differ considerably from other technical fields. 
  Even so, public sector/public interest philanthropic 
research and development aim at a range of different 
objectives, shaped by government policy, funding 
initiatives, institutional goals and objectives, and the 
specific aims of individual researchers and research 
programs. What is considered to be in the "public 
interest" will therefore differ considerably, and will in 
turn flavor IP management choices, depending on 
whether they aim, for example, to: 
•  create new medical treatments and 
disseminate them as widely as possible; 
•  capture the benefits of indigenous research 
and development to promote local 
economic growth and sustainable 
development, including using traditional 
medical knowledge as the basis of 
innovative industries; 
•  secure additional resources through 
licensing and other commercial arrange-
ments to support further research to 
promote the advancement of scientific 
knowledge; 
•  create enabling tools and an enabling 
environment for more widely dispersed and 
broadly based medical innovation, to 
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innovation process by its intended 
beneficiaries; or 
•  create a viable research-based industry 
sector through the formation of new 
commercial entities. 
  Each of these objectives represents a slightly different 
reading of what is the ‘public interest.’ While these 
objectives are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and indeed 
may overlap in practice, a strong emphasis on one or the 
other may well lead to different practical choices in how 
public sector/public interest IP management is conducted. 
Accordingly, no one model of IP management is likely to 
serve the public interest. The choice of IP management 
model should, therefore, follow policy guidance on what 
public interest objectives are to be pursued; this is more 
likely to lead to concrete public benefits than an approach 
that emphasizes the choice of management structure over the 
broader definition of objectives. 
  Clearly, the practical impact and legal implications of 
different weightings of these various factors will differ 
dramatically, and no one model is likely to serve as an 
optimal choice for all technology development and diffusion 
requirements relating to neglected health needs. For 
example, the range of mechanisms reflecting different 
approaches to the deployment of exclusive patent rights 
include the following: 
•  Patent pools: Definitions of patent pools vary greatly, 
but the essential idea is that participating patent 
holders agree to license their technologies to one 
another – some are termed a ‘joint licensing scheme’. 
Usually the technology is in a well-defined field, or 
specific patents may be identified. A closed patent 
pool would restrict access to technology, raising 
potential concerns about anticompetitive impact if it 
excludes legitimate competition by those not taking 
part in the pool. An open patent pool would enable 
access by any party to the technologies covered, 
provided they met the standard conditions and 
undertakings under the pool. 
•  Patent commons: Generally broader in scope than 
patent pools, patent commons allow technology 
holders to pledge their patented technologies for 
widespread use for no royalty payment – usually 
subject to certain general conditions (for instance, 
agreement not to enforce rights over technologies 
resulting from access to the commons). Participants 
may, for instance, legally pledge or covenant not to 
assert their patent rights against those implementing 
the technology in certain humanitarian or other public 
interest domains. 
•  License of right: In the patent law of some countries, 
a ‘license of right’ system provides for a reduction in 
official fees for patent holders who agree to make 
their patented technology available to anyone 
requesting a license, subject to terms that can be 
negotiated or determined by the authorities. The UK 
Patent Office, for instance, maintains a database of 
patented technology that is endorsed as available for a 
license of right. 
•  Non-assertion pledge or covenant: Rather than 
canceling or abandoning their patents, patent holders 
may choose to make their technology widely 
available by legally pledging not to assert their patent 
rights against anyone using the technology. This may 
be restricted to specific uses of the technology (such 
as for specific public health research and develop-
ment activities), limited to certain geographical 
locations (such as countries below a certain average 
level of income), or conditional on the person who 
uses the technology making available improvements 
or derivative inventions on similar terms (in the spirit 
of a ‘commons’). 
•  Humanitarian or preferential licensing: This type of 
licensing technology policy provides highly favorable 
or free terms to certain beneficiaries, for example, 
developing country recipients, social marketing 
programs, or public sector/philanthropic initiatives. 
•  Public domain: Placing technologies directly in the 
public domain is one avenue for their transfer and 
dissemination. Often, technologies are patented in a 
relatively small number of countries, effectively 
placing them in the public domain in all other 
countries as soon as the patent applications are 
published. New technologies may be consigned to the 
public domain, so that anyone is free to use them 
without legal constraint (unless, of course, health and 
safety, environmental, ethical or other regulations 
apply), by the simple act of publishing or otherwise 
communicating them to the public. Special patent 
search tools can identify those technologies that have 
entered the public domain when patents lapse or 
expire. 
•  Open innovation, open source, commons-based peer 
production and distributed innovation: This cluster of 
related concepts features in current discussions about 
innovation models that emphasize a collaborative or 
shared technological platform for innovation. The 
term ‘open source’ originated from a software 
development model that ensures access to the human-
readable ‘source code,’ and permits others to use and 
adapt the software, and to redistribute it, whether or 
not it is modified. Open source is also now used as a 
metaphor or description for other fields of innovation 
in which a technological platform is left open to 
others to use and adapt, and, on the basis of which, 
innovations can in turn be shared, for instance, open 
source biotechnology [15]. 
•  ‘Open innovation’ describes a similar but broader 
approach, emphasizing the interest of many firms in 
seeking synergies and collaboration with other actors 
working on related technologies, as opposed to closed 
innovation which would emphasize firm boundaries 
between rival companies: according to one definition, 
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ideas as well as internal and external paths to market 
to advance the development of new technologies.” 
•  ‘Commons-based peer production’ refers to the 
development of new products through widespread 
collaborative networks without a formal hierarchy, 
often brought about by a sense of collective purpose: 
the Wikipedia online encyclopedia is a good example. 
‘Distributed innovation’ refers to the development of 
innovative products through collective efforts in 
networks spanning different organizations, institut-
ions or individuals. 
  In practice, these different models entail establishing a 
strategic framework and clear overall objectives to help 
guide and inform tactical choices over specific practical 
options: 
•  Publication: what is published, and when, both in 
order to advance the diffusion of knowledge, and to 
safeguard freedom to operate by establishing 
unambiguous public domain status. 
•  Partnerships: what relationships are envisaged with 
what external partners; to the extent that private 
sector resources are determined to be useful, what 
positive inducements can be offered to secure those 
resources, whether these are product development 
capital, capacity to manage liability and risk, product 
development know-how and infrastructure, needed 
background or manufacturing and delivery technolo-
gies, or regulatory dossiers; what guarantees are 
required to ensure that these resources and capacities 
will be available and effectively delivered; and what 
fallback options, march-in rights and other guarantees 
of access will apply in the event that one partner is 
unwilling or unable to meet expectations. 
•  Obtaining IP (typically patents): for what specific 
inventions are patents to be sought; for what practical 
purpose; in what jurisdictions; in whose name; and 
with whose funds. 
•  Exercising IP: should patents be successfully 
obtained, who is to administer the patent estate; and 
again for what purpose, potentially distinguished 
according to jurisdiction (for instance whether 
developed or developing countries), market (public 
sector, philanthropic, or private), field of medical 
application (diseases of affluence or lifestyle diseases, 
as against neglected diseases or diseases endemic in 
the developing world); who is to fund and to enforce 
patents, again, potentially broken down by 
jurisdiction; 
•  Licensing and sharing IP: in line with overall 
objectives, what licensing models are to be pursued, 
and to what end: maximising leverage in order to 
secure additional resources or background technolo-
gies; maintaining leverage over the application of key 
technologies so as to ensure continuing openness of 
access; bolstering local research and development, 
including building up necessary capital investment, 
infrastructure and product development know-how; 
focusing on specific interventions in the form of 
precise research and development outcomes, such as a 
new vaccine or treatment for a neglected disease. 
PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE RIGHT TO 
EXCLUDE: MANAGING GENE PATENTS 
  The complex operational interplay between public and 
private is illustrated in the highly topical instance of the 
patenting of BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. These 
tumour-suppressor genes code for proteins that repair 
damaged DNA, and regulate the growth of cancerous cells. 
Mutations in these genes increase the risk of breast and 
ovarian cancer, so the genes are useful diagnostics for 
susceptibility to these diseases. Few recent patents have been 
as controversial as the “Myriad Genetics” patents on these 
genes [16]. These patents provoked intense criticism and 
legal opposition in Europe and assertion of public use rights 
in Canada [17], due to concern about their impact on the 
public interest. Critics focused especially on the restrictive 
licensing policy employed by Myriad, which reportedly 
entailed actively restricting academic research using the 
patented gene [18], and was labeled ‘abusive,’ “immoral” 
and “unethical” in some critical accounts.
23 A broad coalition 
of public health, research and civil society actors opposed 
European patents.
24 The rationale for the opposition against 
the patent went well beyond the strict patentability of the 
claimed subject matter, and addressed the underlying 
concern related to the negative social impact that the patent 
was felt to have: in particular, it constrained the use of a 
genetic diagnostic for susceptibility to ovarian or breast 
cancer. The European Patent Office (EPO), when issuing a 
press release concerning this opposition, felt constrained to 
point out that it “has not been vested with the task of taking 
into account the economic effects of the grant of patents in 
specific areas [19].” This statement, and the wide-ranging 
controversy it responds to, together underscore the difficult 
task of distinguishing between pre-grant regulation of the 
public interest through the accurate application of 
patentability criteria, and post-grant regulation of the 
exercise and public-interest impact of otherwise technically-
valid patents. 
  In effect, the opposition to the patents operated at three 
levels: blanket opposition to the very idea of gene patenting, 
as a fundamental policy concern; challenging the validity of 
these patents under existing patent law; and concern about 
how the patented technologies were licensed, which was felt 
                                                 
23e.g. in Keeping Science Open: the Effects of Intellectual Property Policy 
on the Conduct of Science, Royal Society, 2003, at 10, citing also Wadman, 
Testing time for gene patent as Europe 
rebels, Nature 413 (2002), pp. 443. 
24EP 705902 was opposed by the Social Democratic Party of Switzerland, 
Berne; Greenpeace Germany, Hamburg; the Institut Curie, Paris; Assistance 
publique - Hôpitaux de Paris, Paris; the Institut Gustave Roussy, Villejuif 
(F); the Belgian Society of Human Genetics et al., Brussels; Dr Wilhelms, 
Göhrde (D); the Netherlands, represented by the Ministry of Health, The 
Hague; and the Austrian Federal Ministry of Social Security, Vienna; and 
EP 705903 was opposed by the Institut Curie; Assistance publique - 
Hôpitaux de Paris; the Institut Gustave Roussy; the Vereniging van 
Stichtingen Klinische Genetica, Leiden (NL); the Netherlands, represented 
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to impose unreasonable costs on public health providers and 
to limit necessary cancer research. Uniting these three layers 
was a background concern about the impact on effective and 
equitable universal access to this important diagnostic tool. 
In considering the impact of the IP system on public health, 
and its potentially positive role in fulfilling a right to health, 
it is therefore necessary to clarify the distinct impacts on 
these three levels. 
  The Myriad case, in particular, alerts us to the need to 
consider patterns of ownership and licensing of the patents in 
question, apart from their technical validity. Key “Myriad” 
patents held by a public institution, University of Utah (a 
state university), and a national government, the United 
States (represented by the official responsible for public 
health policy, the Secretary, Department of Health and 
Human Services). Several patents were not held by a private 
company at all, although Myriad held exclusive licenses. 
Further, when this patenting activity came to light, a patent 
application on the BRCA2 gene was filed by Cancer 
Research Technology Ltd, the technology licensing arm of a 
British cancer research charity, and this matured into a 
granted patent in 2004. The patentee immediately announced 
that it would freely license the use of this patent to public 
laboratories. The grant of this patent and this open licensing 
structure were positively welcomed by a number of the 
critics of the original Myriad patents. Gert Matthijs, head of 
molecular diagnostics at the University Hospital Leuven, 
who was active in the opposition proceedings, expressed 
“strong appreciation to Cancer Research UK because they 
have chosen to offer royalty-free licenses on its patent on the 
BRCA2 gene to public health services in European countries 
[20].” 
  While the BRCA cases raise many legal and policy 
issues, they illustrate firstly that many privately-exercised 
health-related technologies are not in private hands, strictly 
speaking, but are held by various public and public-interest 
entities, and secondly that modes of licensing may be far 
more significant in ensuring equitable access than “pure” 
questions of patentability, or technical validity. Matthijs 
suggests, on the basis of the BRCA cases, that a “system 
rather like royalties for use of music might be one way 
forward to reimburse researchers for the costs of discovering 
genes and then make them available to others at an 
affordable price,” in other words, a distinct liability regime 
for gene patents in particular, under which the patentee 
would simply be entitled to an equitable remuneration and 
could not obtain injunctive relief.
25 The Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics concluded “that the protection by use patents of 
specific diagnostic tests which are based on DNA sequences 
could provide an effective means of rewarding the inventor 
while providing an incentive for others to develop alternative 
tests” but that for “patents that have been granted for 
diagnostic tests based on genes, compulsory licensing may 
be required to ensure reasonable licensing terms are 
available to enable alternative tests to be developed [21].” 
  More recently, in the United States, two patents on 
BRCA genes held by Myriad Genetics have been challenged 
by the American Civil Liberties Union among others on the 
basis that the patents are unconstitutional and invalid [22]. 
The complaint filed addressed the inherent patentability of 
nucleotide sequences isolated from the human genome, but 
also cited concerns about specific consequences 'because 
Myriad chooses not to license the patents broadly.' This 
paper advances no position on the merits or the basis of these 
                                                 
25This already can apply within the standards of the Trips Agreement for 
public non-commercial use of patented inventions: TRIPS Article 44.2 
means that patent law may limit the remedies available to compensation 
only, and may preclude the possibility of an injunction. 
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Fig. (2). Outline of the innovation financing structure reportedly applied in the development of diagnostic tests by Myriad Genetics, 
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claims; the case is cited only to demonstrate that there is in 
such cases a clear connection between claims about the 
welfare impact of patents as such, and the choices made in 
the deployment of those patents – the IP management 
choices. 
  For its part, representatives of Myriad [23] have pointed 
out that this innovation model (see Fig. 2) [11] enables: (i) 
investment to develop the discovery for the public benefit; 
(ii) funding and resources for further research (royalties, 
licensing fees, taxes, etc.; (iii) investment in improvements 
to further enhance the quality of the test and genetic services; 
(iv) investment in provider education to expand service and 
access ; and (v) better healthcare. 
  Thus, the “Myriad” case – from a critical perspective, 
viewed as an example of private-sector interests trumping 
sound public health policy – can also be seen as epitomizing 
the contrast between two conflicting perspectives on the 
management of public-sector assets and of the optimal 
financing of public goods in the public health domain. The 
“privatized” approach actually makes use of a patent held by 
a national government and a state university, which is 
licensed to a private company, formed as a spin-off from the 
University as a market-based means of promoting 
technology transfer to the public; the open, public-licensing 
approach is undertaken by a private company (wholly-owned 
by an independent charity) which owns and licences the 
relevant patent in conjunction with a private university. 
Myriad was reportedly in 2006 yet to turn a profit, largely 
because of its high expenditures on research and 
development, its accumulated losses by the end of 2005 
amounting to some $180mn [24],
  recalling that its very 
existence stems in part from a perceived past failure to 
garner the resources for outcome-oriented product 
development through exclusively public means. 
  Indeed, the exercise of the Myriad patents is not an 
example of pure private interest, but rather the consequence 
of a conscious public policy choice made by the United 
States [24], expressed in the form of the Bayh-Dole Act.
26 
Behind this 1980 legislation is perhaps a perception that 
governments are ill-suited and under-funded to undertake the 
management of IP that is required to bring an invention to 
the public in the form of a practical product, even where the 
underlying research is financed by the public purse. This 
reportedly led to a kind of market failure in the delivery of 
new technologies to the public, including in such crucial 
areas as medical technology: by one account, by 1980, “the 
Government had accumulated in its patent portfolio about 
30,000 patents of which only about 5% had been licensed to 
industry with an even smaller percentage reflected in 
products or processes in commercial use [25].” 
  Bayh-Dole required public universities to establish 
technology licensing offices, to implement this form of 
public knowledge management. The Utah Technology 
Commercialization Office describes its goals as including 
generating revenue for the University, promoting economic 
growth in the State of Utah, and ensuring public benefit from 
                                                 
26 35 U.S.C. § 200-212. 
technologies developed by the University [26]. Bayh-Dole is 
possibly the most widely-analysed and debated model for 
management of publicly-funded knowledge, but this 
statutory approach is only one avenue among a number of 
possibilities, at several levels of institutional and regulatory 
frameworks. The full range of potential mechanisms to 
manage IP directly to promote public interest goals in the 
field of public health include: 
  statutory law [27], which may be reflected directly in 
national patent laws,
27 and specific laws governing 
university research;
28 
  national policies governing the use of public funds for 
research; 
  the policies of specific funding agencies; 
  the policy and practice of public research institutes, 
and technology management associations [28]; 
  the policy and practice of specific entities established 
to promote public-interest health research and 
development (in particular, the highly-focused 
“public-private partnerships (PPPs)” created to focus 
resources on creating new products to address 
neglected health needs) [29]; 
  distinct incentive mechanisms such as prize funds, 
including models that would altogether dispense with 
or limit the application of IP rights. 
  While these forms of intervention differ considerably in 
their legal status and practical operation, they all represent 
attempts to address the question of how to deploy statutory 
exclusive rights so as to promote the public interest. Some 
are specific to the public health sector; others concentrate on 
that sector in practice because of the high level of public 
funding devoted to public health research, in contrast to most 
other areas of technology. Behind the policy choices in these 
mechanisms is the need to take account of the actual 
innovation structures that are emerging in the medical 
domain. The discovery and development of new drugs and 
vaccines typically require diverse resources and inputs both 
from public sources and from private industry. The extent 
and nature of these inputs naturally differ widely in distinct 
innovation processes, and the comparative value of private 
as against public inputs in health innovation is debated in 
general. Allocation of resources is now a critical issue for 
diseases and health needs which have been neglected by 
market-driven development processes. 
  Policymakers who seek optimal structures and 
interventions to overcome neglect and deficiencies in 
available public health technologies are therefore probing the 
                                                 
27e.g. United States Code Title 35 – Patents, Chapter 18 — Patent Rights In 
Inventions Made With Federal Assistance, 35 U.S.C. 200 Policy and 
objective: “It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use the patent 
system to promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally 
supported research or development;… to ensure that the Government 
obtains sufficient rights in federally supported inventions to meet the needs 
of the Government and protect the public against nonuse or unreasonable 
use of inventions….” 
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interface between public and private inputs in medical 
research and development. For governmental, international 
and philanthropic funding agencies and other public health 
initiatives, finding the right interface between public and 
private inputs is an immediate practical need. This interface 
is inherently complex, but is defined in part by a range of IP 
laws, standards and management strategies. The IP system is 
conventionally viewed as a legally-determined ‘balance’ 
between public and private interests, framed in legislation 
and shaped by international standards. Debate revolves 
around whether, and how, IP law should be interpreted 
through, or subordinated to, public policy objectives and 
other international law principles, notably the right to health. 
Yet this balance is dynamic, and its overall beneficial impact 
is achieved through the concretion over time of many 
distinct acts in the practical exercise of rights, interests and 
legal safeguards. 
  The formal legal framework defines a policy and legal 
space, but gives limited practical guidance on optimal 
choices and public health strategies within that space. 
Accordingly, public-interest IP management is emerging as a 
priority in bridging the 10/90-health research gap – the 
finding of the Commission on Health Research for 
Development that less than 10% of global health research 
resources are applied to the health burdens is of developing 
countries, which amount to more than 90% of the world’s 
health problems [30]. Different approaches to ownership and 
access of IP, guarantee of public interest, and market and 
non-market incentives, including transjurisdictional trade-
offs, can leverage otherwise unobtainable public health 
benefits; but simply to invoke ‘IP’ as an innovation model or 
to foreswear it as an innovation model does not in itself 
provide practical guidance to public sector knowledge 
managers seeking to advance public health objectives. 
 From  this  analysis,  ex-ante  IP management strategies 
need to assess public sector needs before and during the 
interface with the private sector. This entails making 
systematic choices about managing IP interests during the 
initial funding and R&D phases, so that public sector players 
can structure and define their interaction with the private 
sector to promote public health benefits. This approach 
contrasts with discussions centering on ex-post interventions, 
when IP typically serves as a symbol for asymmetries of 
ownership and access, and the public interest is characterized 
by negotiations over pricing, or the threat or implementation 
of compulsory licensing and government use mechanisms; 
these are essentially public-interest remedies, rather than 
strategic management of collective knowledge goods. A 
comprehensive, strategic approach would address the 
undermanagement of public IP interests integrally during the 
research and development process. Combined with limited 
awareness of practical enabling strategies within the IP 
policy and legal space, an exclusive focus on ex-post 
intervention can constrict public health outcomes. Ideally, 
ex-ante IP management would positively to construct 
pathways for equitable outcomes and enhanced access for 
the poor to finished medical products, while promoting 
dynamic innovation, empowering low and middle income 
countries to secure indigenous public health solutions, and to 
meet the Millennium Development Goals relating to public 
health and partnership for development [31]. 
  This entails studying the practical options for managing 
IP to promote the creation, development and effective 
dissemination of medical research outcomes for neglected 
diseases or diseases of poverty [32]. In contrast to the 
diseases prevalent in industrialized countries, established 
drug development processes have given scant attention to a 
number of widespread infectious diseases that are suffered 
by the poor and predominantly afflict the developing world. 
The research and development effort falls well short of the 
level of need proportionate with the scale of this disease 
burden. This ‘fatal imbalance’ [33] has led to calls for 
international policy initiatives to refocus research and drug 
development.
29 The challenges for the creation and delivery 
of new treatments for neglected diseases include: 
•  identifying promising leads and creating new 
candidate compounds, an essentially scientific 
activity applying basic research capacity to neglected 
diseases; 
•  transforming compounds into new medicines, 
entailing extensive clinical testing, regulatory 
approval, and access to associated technologies, 
manufacturing capacity and delivery platforms; 
•  health infrastructure, distribution chain and cost 
issues which can determine how many patients gain 
access to new medicines and how effectively they are 
delivered and administered within the context of 
overall health care. 
  Analysis of the problem of neglected diseases has 
highlighted impediments or shortcomings at each of these 
stages, but emphasis has been laid on the need to improve 
the drug development pipeline, since there is evidence of 
promising new compounds remaining undeveloped due to 
the lack of incentives to take such compounds through the 
development process.
30 Policy settings are also seen as an 
obstacle to translating medical knowledge into actual 
tangible benefits, where the basic science is well known and 
current technology offers solutions in principle.
31 There are 
diverse possible structures for filling this drug development 
gap, which draw on a range of inputs and are adapted to the 
practical needs in each case. 
  Both public and private inputs have in practice been vital 
in achieving public health outcomes: one estimate indicates 
that of the more than US$70 bn invested in global health 
R&D in 1998, 50% of the funds came from public sources, 
and 50% from private sources (84% of which was provided 
by the pharmaceutical industry, the remainder from private 
not-for profit funding) [34]. The private sector role has been 
                                                 
29For example, Carlos Morel, ‘Neglected diseases: under-funded research 
and inadequate health interventions,’ EMBO Reports, Vol. 4, 2003, at p. 
S35. 
30Numerous promising drug and vaccine leads are sitting on the shelf. It is 
time for pharmaceutical science to deliver on its tremendous promise for the 
developing world,’ Dr. Victoria Hale, at www.oneworldhealth.org. 
31This point is made by Alimuddin Zumla, ‘Reflection & Reaction: Drugs 
for Neglected Diseases,’ The Lancet Infectious Diseases, Vol. 2 (July 2002), 
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important when research moves beyond basic science to the 
clinical trials and other development steps required to prove 
the efficacy and safety of new products and to bring them to 
fruition as readily available treatments. The scientific and 
technical skills that are the traditional strengths of the 
research community need to be supplemented by cross-
disciplinary expertise in product development, regulatory 
processes, production and distribution.
32 Both sets of skills 
are vital for the pharmaceutical development process, 
whether it is public-funded or based in the private-sector. 
  Hence even publicly-funded research programs have 
entailed some form of engagement of private sector entities 
at some stage as the initial research breakthrough is taken 
from the laboratory to the dispensary, to be available to the 
public as a proven, tested, stable, mass produced and 
efficacious pharmaceutical. In this process, public and 
private inputs may be required, both to marshal the necessary 
resources and development skills, and to secure access to 
associated technologies and know how. So the immediate 
and pressing concerns about major public health problems 
tap into the broader, long-running public policy debate: how 
best to promote innovative research and development in the 
private sector, and to focus it on areas of need, while still 
ensuring effective public availability of new technologies for 
the overall welfare of society? How to encourage private 
activity that promotes the broader public interest? It is 
perhaps inevitable, then, that the debate turns to some extent 
on the role and effect of patents in the health domain. Patents 
are intended to promote innovative private sector activity 
(research and investment in development of new 
technologies) for the overall public good, but how to 
optimize the public interest, especially public health 
outcomes, within the patent framework remains a contested 
issue. 
PRACTICAL LESSONS FROM PUBLIC PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS 
  One specific vantage point from which to review these 
issues is to consider a tailor-made mechanism for harnessing 
private interests to achieve specific public health outcomes - 
the public private partnership (PPP) agreements created to 
address neglected needs for medical research and 
development. These partnerships typically aim to achieve 
two distinct outcomes – first, creating a new technology 
(such as a new pharmaceutical treatment or vaccine),
33 and 
                                                 
32‘While supporting basic and drug-lead discovery research, the public 
sector has rarely developed its own drug development expertise and 
capacity. It is the pharmaceutical industry that leads product development, 
from pre-clinical research through regulatory approval,’ ‘Fatal Imbalance, 
The Crisis in Research and Development for Drugs for Neglected Diseases,’ 
MSF and DND Working Group, 2001, p.20. 
33These may be formally structured partnerships or other distinct initiatives 
with a specific objectives to develop and disseminate new medical products; 
widely discussed examples include Medicines for Malaria Venture (MMV) 
(http://www.mmv.org), International Partnership for Microbicides 
(http://www.ipm-microbicides.org). Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative 
(DNDi), Medicines for Malaria Venture (MMV), the Malaria Vaccine 
Initiative (MVI), the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IAVI), the 
Institute for One World Health (IOWH) and the Global Alliance for TB 
Drug Development (GATB). Partnerships may also be more ad hoc in 
character, such as cooperation between industry and the U.S. Walter Reed 
Army Institute of Research to develop antimalarial medicines. 
second, ensuring that this technology is practically available 
as a safe and effective finished product to as many intended 
beneficiaries as possible – this means some mix of positive 
incentives and contractual guarantees that ensure the finished 
product will be distributed well beyond the scope that the 
regular commercial market would service. A report prepared 
for the World Health Organization Commission on 
Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health 
distinguished PPPs for product development for neglected 
diseases from PPPs focussed on access to existing drugs: 
product development public/private partnerships 
(PDPPPs) focused on the development of new 
drugs, vaccines, and other products for diseases 
that disproportionately affect developing 
countries. PDPPPs are nonprofit entities that 
sponsor others to perform or directly perform 
themselves at least one of the following R&D 
activities: basic research (such as target 
identification, validation and proof of concept), 
animal, preclinical and clinical testing, 
licensing, and manufacturing. The successful 
PDPPP may also be responsible for distribution. 
PDPPPs are distinguished from Access PPPs, 
which are nonprofit entities concerned primarily 
with expanding access by pulling together 
manufacturers, funding agencies (such as 
GAVI, USAID) and developing countries to 
enable the purchase and distribution of existing 
drugs, vaccines, and other medical products 
[35]. 
  The focus of this paper is not a detailed analysis of PPPs, 
and rather a review of options at a broader level, no views 
are offered here on exact classification issues, and examples 
are cited for illustrative purposes only. More detailed studies 
are available on some of the specific choices that are 
discussed here in much more general terms [36]. PPP 
mechanisms, as agreements governing a relationship 
between public/philanthropic entities and private sector 
partners, naturally entail careful definition of rights and 
expectations concerning background IP (IP that both or 
either partners may bring to the partnership) and research or 
project IP (IP generated in the course of funded research and 
development, which may be fundamental in nature, or may 
be improvements, developments of existing technologies, or 
new applications). Hence PPPs usually require both a 
strategic, policy-oriented approach to IP issues (since they 
are typically conceived as addressing unmet needs that the 
existing systems have failed to serve), and a pragmatic, 
tactical use of IP and agreements on IP management to 
generate the desired outcomes (given that they also aim to 
ensure as a practical result the widest effective access to an 
actual finished product among neglected communities). PPPs 
have been established consciously to build alternative 
pathways to the creation and equitable dissemination of new 
medical treatments. Yet the economics and infrastructure of 
medical R&D mean that private players will have to be 
involved: “ [t]he public research community … is primarily 
involved in the early phases of basic research and drug 
discovery. The expertise, infrastructure and management 
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development process is concentrated in the private sector 
[37].” Accordingly, the approach to IP management - the 
choices made by PPPs to seek and assert the exclusive rights 
granted under the IP system - will provide insights into the 
broader policy issue of how to define and promote a clearer, 
more effective contribution on the part of private sector 
interests towards the goal of stronger public health outcomes 
in geographical areas and for diseases that have been poorly 
serviced by the conventional drug development processes. In 
short, they illustrate in microcosm the overarching question 
of how to manage IP-based exclusivity to harness private 
resources so as to yield inclusive public health outcomes, 
enable direct and focused way that simply relying on the 
‘invisible hand.’ 
  When such partnerships involve the research and 
development of new technologies, IP is managed through a 
range of diverse strategies to achieve certain defined public 
health goals by:
34 
  arranging ownership and maintenance of IP generated 
by the new research they commission, including 
arrangements that respect different conditions (e.g. 
the private sector player maintaining rights to markets 
in rich countries, as a condition of ceding rights for 
developing country markets); 
  leveraging IP to ensure access to background, related 
IP that is needed either for the research or the 
development and implementation phase; 
  provisions on licensing new technologies (such as 
favorable conditions for the private sector player for 
target markets – public sector or developing country 
markets - possibly in exchange for access to rich 
markets); 
  undertakings on specific steps to make new product 
available, backed by guarantees on access to 
necessary IP for third parties - e.g. to test data, 
background technology, manufacturing know-how – 
in the event that the private sector partner fails to 
meet the agreed public interest criteria for 
dissemination of the new product. 
  What is striking about the approach taken in managing IP 
by these PPP initiatives is the fundamental pragmatism that 
is applied. IP is seen simply as an implement or practical 
mechanism to achieve the public-interests of the initiative. 
For example, the Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative 
(DNDi) [38] was consciously created as a non-market 
alternative to drug development, amidst a climate of concern 
and criticism directed at conventional pathways, and their 
limitations, due in part to the impact of the patent system 
[39]. It has adopted an IP policy that foresees a distinct, if 
limited, role for IP management to achieve its objectives; for 
instance, the policy recognizes that ‘it is possible that 
promoting DNDi’s mission and goals will sometimes require 
                                                 
34See Antony Taubman, Public-private management of intellectual property 
for public health outcomes in the developing world: the lessons of access 
conditions in research and development agreements, Initiative on Public-
Private Partnerships for Health (IPPPH),  Geneva  2004, at 
http://www.globalforumhealth.org/filesupld/ippph_cd/04.PDF. 
outputs to be protected by IP” even if, “ [g]iven the costs 
involved, patenting is likely to be the exception rather than 
the rule” and “non-patent types of IP such as confidential 
information … and copyrights will also need to be 
considered [40].” In particular, it may be necessary “ to deal 
with IP to conclude contracts and undertake research with its 
research partners, contractors, collaborators and founders; 
obtain rights to work on and develop molecules, including 
facilitating DNDi’s or its partners’ access to proprietary 
research materials; and ensure equitable access to, and 
affordability of, the end products of its research for patients 
[40].” It then elaborates how IP management will be 
undertaken to retain full freedom to operate, including using 
assignment of IP to DNDi, exclusive licences and licences of 
right. DNDi would “negotiate terms with partners to ensure 
that they will not use the acquired and/or held IP in a manner 
that impedes equitable and affordable access to the products 
of the research, or that impedes additional or follow-on 
research by DNDi, its partners and other researchers, 
especially those undertaking research on neglected diseases 
[40].” It would ensure “the availability and affordability of 
neglected disease therapeutics” by transferring or out-
licensing technologies “to facilitate manufacturing and 
distribution of its products [11].” This pragmatic approach 
does not mean that the management of IP occurs in a policy 
vacuum: “in addition to a pragmatic day to day approach on 
IP the DNDi is committed to contribute to the thinking and 
development of IP approaches in health R&D that are aimed 
at serving the public good [40].” Indeed, the lessons from 
practical experience in product development and 
dissemination are vital inputs to the policymaking process, 
as a valuable reality check for a policy debate that can veer 
into abstractions. And, by definition, this pragmatic approach 
can of course preclude use of the patent system altogether: 
the first product released by the DNDi initiative [41], ASAQ, 
a new fixed-dose combination of artesunate (AS) and 
amodiaquine (AQ), was released for dispensation throughout 
sub-Saharan Africa having been developed under DNDi 
management in partnership with sanofi-aventis. The drug is 
reportedly to be available at a “no profit-no loss” price to 
“public organizations of endemic countries, international 
institutions, NGOs, and programs promoting access to drugs 
in pharmacies [41].” DNDi pointed out that the “fact that 
ASAQ is made so affordable right from the start and is not 
under patent removes a significant barrier to its availability 
and should serve as a model for future drug development for 
neglected diseases.”
35 Another IP tool, trademarks, are used 
to distinguish the distribution of the treatment to public 
markets, and its distribution at a higher price to private 
markets (under the mark Coarsucam
®), a tiered pricing 
scheme with the effect of cross subsidizing low cost public 
distribution from the private market. 
  The International AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IAVI), a not-
for-profit entity, points out that as “much of the expertise in 
the field [of HIV vaccine science] resides in the private 
sector, it is vital to promote investment from private 
industry” yet that IP “should be managed with multiple goals 
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in mind: the need to promote innovation and investment, as 
well as the need to ensure future vaccines are made available 
to poorer countries at affordable prices [42].” IAVI has 
sought patents on several inventions,
36 noting that “IP rights 
can and should be managed to support widespread access to 
health technologies, particularly in the developing world 
[42]” citing such means as: 
•  “segmenting markets to allow tiered (or differential) 
pricing for different countries, depending on their 
ability to pay, or by retaining licenses for use.” 
•  stipulating that any licensee of its patent technology 
“uses it in a manner consistent with our mission of 
providing poorer countries affordable access to health 
technologies”. 
•  “Ensuring that the technology will be made available 
in those countries even if the partner fails to meet its 
commitment” through “march-in rights,” that 
“typically provide IAVI with guarantees that the 
technology, data, materials and licenses needed to 
manufacture and deliver the vaccine will be 
transferred to IAVI.” 
•  “access commitments” providing that any vaccine 
“will be promptly registered, manufactured in 
adequate quantities and distributed at reasonable 
prices in the developing world” subject to differential 
pricing: a vaccine is available in developed countries 
at market prices, but “must be made available in the 
developing world at an affordable price”. 
  While working in different therapeutic fields from DNDi, 
IAVI similarly stresses the pragmatic focus of its approach: 
“having a wide range of partner organizations requires IAVI 
to approach IP management with flexibility, but based on 
[the] two clear needs” of accelerating “the development of 
safe, effective, preventive AIDS vaccines” and ensuring 
“they will be made available in developing countries rapidly 
after licensure, at reasonable prices, and in sufficient 
quantities.” It points to the need to explore new ways of 
using IP to structure and define partnerships, and in 
particular to leverage access, so that “IAVI’s research 
partnerships include novel intellectual property provisions to 
maximize future access in developing countries to the fruits 
of IAVI’s R&D [43].” 
  Actual experiences of PPPs shed light on several aspects 
of how the diverse inputs into new products are garnered and 
deployed, in particular: 
•  How formal legal structures define partnerships and 
capture the mutual expectations of widely diverse 
actors are defined, bridging between commercial and 
public interest actors and value systems, and between 
                                                 
36See e.g. international patent applications WO 2007/143606 (HIV-1 Clade 
A Consensus Sequences, Antigens, And Transgenes); WO 2007/127372, 
Genetic Adjuvants For Viral Vaccines; WO 2005/047483, Renta: An HIV 
Immunogen And Uses Thereof; WO 2001/047955, Improvements In Or 
Relating To Immune Responses To HIV; WO 2001/031046, Invasive 
Bacterial Vectors For Expressing Alphavirus Replicons (several have since 
matured into national patents, now in force). 
differing perspectives of funding and industry 
partners, so as to reinforce shared objectives. 
•  The pragmatic construction of differing roles and the 
different allocation of resources, rights and 
responsibilities necessary to achieve defined public 
health goals. 
•  A broader understanding of practical means of 
resolving the public policy dilemma of balancing 
private incentive to generate needed public health 
products against the goal of guaranteed access to 
those in need. 
  The focus on delivery of concrete outcomes requires 
careful consideration of the target groups, disease burdens, 
and drug dissemination strategy that then shape specific IP 
management choices geared to delivering the required new 
public health interventions. For instance, IP management 
may be structured to free up other (richer) markets or other 
(more profitable) indications for a private sector partner, thus 
enabling effective cross-subsidization of the development 
and dissemination of products for poorly resourced or 
otherwise neglected patients. Effective IP management may 
further save costs and resources, by enabling burden sharing 
for clinical trials and the use of test data for regulatory 
approval. 
  Public interest IP management may entail planning for 
access to new medicines at two levels – as a pressing policy 
issue and as an immediate practical need. Policy and 
practical perspectives can inform the development and 
greater understanding of hybrid forms of IP management that 
would give funding agencies, government authorities and 
philanthropic initiatives bargaining power, leverage over 
technologies they help develop, freedom to operate in 
serving their target areas for delivery of new medicines, and 
the capacity to catalyze new resources and negotiate access 
to the panoply of technologies needed to deliver affordably a 
new drug that is safe and effective. Equally, there is a 
practical imperative to offer rivate sector players enough 
legal clarity and workable commercial structures that enable 
commitment of product research, development and 
manufacturing resources. 
  Access to new treatments may entail two steps: the 
creation of R&D outcomes that would otherwise not exist 
(due to lack of market interest); and promotion of the widest 
possible actual availability of a product once it is clinically 
proven and viable. A review of choices made in PPPs can 
show how these joint objectives are addressed in parallel, so 
that practical IP arrangements in the agreements factor in 
long-term access guarantees at the early stages of research, 
guarantees that may be determined by 
•  Setting a price (or more likely a pricing formula) to 
be available to specific communities (a ‘reasonable’, 
‘social marketing,’ or ‘public sector’ price for specific 
markets, which may effectively be cross-subsidized 
by the opportunity to secure higher prices under IP 
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•  Other guaranteed levels of performance (for instance, 
requiring finished products to be available for defined 
markets, or establishing timing deadlines, such as 
ensuring product availability for specified markets 
within a given time from first entry to any market) 
•  Reserve (‘march-in’) rights to access or utilise IP 
created under the project, in the event that 
performance levels are not attained, potentially 
including not only directly funded research IP, but all 
the necessary IP to put the technology into effect, 
which may extend to background IP, manufacturing 
know how or reference to regulatory dossiers) 
  An access-oriented model of IP management may focus 
on pragmatically leveraging optimal downstream distribution 
of a finished product, rather than giving priority to 
ownership of IP as such, so that ownership can be traded off 
against targeted performance guarantees, access to related 
technology and regulatory dossiers, and other mechanisms to 
promote diffusion among priority recipients. Hence a 
practical concentration on downstream access can determine 
basic choices and tradeoffs with commercial partners over: 
•  ownership of IP that is generated through funded 
research; 
•  leveraging access to background or related IP, and 
other resources such as regulatory data required to 
bring the desired product to the target communities; 
•  provisions on licensing new technologies (such as 
favorable conditions for target markets); 
•  undertakings on specific steps to make new product 
available for neglected therapeutic uses or for certain 
priority groups; 
•  guarantees on access for certain third parties - e.g. to 
test data, background technology, capacity building – 
to enable priority needs to be served. 
  One strategy in the creative IP licensing in PPPs is to 
negotiate access to technologies and other resources beyond 
the scope of the sponsored research, since the practical 
delivery of the finished product typically requires 
considerably more than access to a single technology 
produced by the research. PPPs may also safeguard access 
by structuring the partnership to include alternative access 
pathways in case an industry partner is unable or unwilling 
to meet agreed performance standards (in particular, failing 
to meet obligations to make the product available to specific 
markets); this may entail agreement to provide access in 
agreed circumstances to: 
•  background technologies required to ensure that a 
new product or adapted technology can be made 
available in the most useful and cost effective 
manner, including technologies such as manufactu-
ring processes, adjuvants, excipients and delivery 
technologies; 
•  test data and support for regulatory approval, so as to 
reduce any costs, delays or duplication of clinical 
trials in the introduction of new products or in the 
dissemination of existing products to new recipients 
in neglected countries; or 
•  technology transfer and capacity building so that 
alternative producers can take up the technology 
when the originator is unable or unwilling to service 
certain markets. 
  Public interest IP management mechanisms put into 
effect by PPPs may take a pragmatic approach to ownership 
of IP produced under the partnership arrangements, and not 
view it as an end in itself. Ownership of IP is potentially a 
significant cost and a burdensome administrative demand for 
public sector or philanthropic institutions, and may be more 
productively traded off against other guarantees of access to 
covered and background technologies, and guarantees of 
access to finished pharmaceutical products. On the other 
hand, ownership brings with it negotiating strength, and 
guarantees of continuing strong leverage over core 
technologies. This may be especially important when third 
parties are involved – such as through open source or patent 
pool licensing structures – and the assertion of IP rights may 
be needed to ensure continuing leverage over downstream 
and third party uses of covered technology, rather than 
reliance on contractual obligations to safeguard continuing 
access to improvements or applications of covered 
technology, since these may be hard to sustain or enforce 
through contract alone. Using the ‘exclusive right’ available 
under IP law to leverage and potentially enforce continuing 
open source or patent pooling arrangements, and to ensure 
access to applications or adaptations of core technology, is 
perhaps the exemplary case of using the exclusive right to 
ensure inclusion. In practice, the management of IP 
ownership may also lead to: 
  withholding the transfer of IP ownership to an 
industry partner until it is financially established and 
clearly established as an effective manager of the 
covered IP; 
  retaining ownership in public/philanthropic hands for 
target markets, while permitting an industry partner to 
retain ownership elsewhere, so as to facilitate product 
development and to harvest the spin off benefits that 
arise from development of the product for distribution 
in wealthier markets; 
  leaving ownership to an industry partner as an 
element of the overall trade-off that effectively uses 
IP to leverage the application of private resources to 
serve public interest outcomes, the trade-off of 
ownership being engineered through: 
•  securing non-ownership guarantees on 
access to new IP and background IP (such 
as humanitarian or developed-country 
licenses, or march in rights when access 
conditions are not met); 
•  avoiding the costs and liabilities of 
maintaining an IP portfolio, while 
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freedom to operate that is required to meet 
the defined public interest goals. 
  An essentially pragmatic view would also address 
squarely how to structure the most effective, optimal form of 
partnering, as a priority over any specific legal formula; in 
principle, in establishing the legal structure of a partnership 
form should follow function, even if in practice there is a 
tendency to rely on existing formulae and precedents. The 
structure of the partnership should reflect common 
understanding of shared values and objectives, recognition of 
and respect for distinct interests and operational constraints, 
and the establishment of realistic expectations of the two 
partners. The structuring of respective rights and obligations 
is likely to be assisted by consciously recognizing the 
distinct institutional context of private sector and public 
sector/philanthropic actors, and seeking a dynamic 
reconciliation on the basis of acceptance that immediate 
interests, overall goals and cultural values inevitably diverge; 
and that lack of confidence and mutual understanding can 
itself impede or prevent the attainment of shared objectives 
and the most fruitful pooling of resources. Practical 
experience may also lead to a reassessment of the 
assumptions and structures that have underpinned a 
partnership, and may lead to insights about rights, 
undertakings, flexibilities and clarifications, as well as the 
overall mix of incentives and inputs, that could make the 
project more successful than a mechanism conceived in a 
more abstract environment and articulated in a legalistic 
manner. 
  Partnerships ultimately concern the establishment of 
obligations for technology development and access. These 
may address: 
•  the research and creation of new technology per se, or 
the availability of necessary technology and 
associated data 
•  obligations on the research/industry partner to 
undertake research and development, and to make 
available background IP, know-how and associated 
data (including technical know-how or skills and 
resources required for product development, clinical 
trials and regulatory approval know-how, as well as 
the data on safety and efficacy produced by clinical 
trials). 
  Provisions may amount to a positive undertaking - such 
as an agreement to undertake research or to provide 
technology - or an obligation to license or transfer IP rights 
in the event the research/industry partner fails to, or has 
insufficient interest to, develop and disseminate covered 
technology in a particular market. 
  Downstream technology dissemination provisions set 
conditions for how the covered technology is to be 
distributed or marked by the research/industry partner 
•  potentially by setting a price or criterion (such as 
‘reasonable price’ or ‘public sector price’) for 
determining the price for distribution in a certain 
market); 
•  or stipulating more generally that the pharmaceutical 
will be ‘reasonably available’ or otherwise comply 
with more general criteria; 
•  and may provide distinct requirements for how the 
pharmaceutical is to be distributed in distinct markets, 
such as an undertaking to cross-subsidize developing 
country or public sector distribution on the basis of 
preferential pricing; 
•  or by setting out other conditions defining how access 
to the covered pharmaceutical should be granted on 
the basis of market or non-market mechanisms. 
  In practice, agreements between public and private sector 
partners differ significantly according to: 
•  different strategic judgments and assessments about 
the most effective incentive structure, and the 
negotiating dynamics that yield a particular 
agreement; 
•  the nature of the contributions brought by the two 
parties - whether the public partner is providing 
background IP, for example, and funding may support 
a stand-alone research program or supplement an 
existing program; 
•  External, more objective factors, including market 
and infrastructure issues : 
  size and characteristics of patient 
population for the target disease, 
  availability of sustainable funding from 
private and public sources, 
  cost and cost-effectiveness of given 
vaccines and drugs, 
  health care delivery systems, including 
drug or vaccine distribution and delivery 
plans, 
  economics and structure of the relevant 
industry sector, and 
  pattern of ownership of and freedom to use 
necessary background technology, 
  availability of alternative interventions 
(e.g. for a new malaria drug there could be 
competing drugs, preventative measures 
such as potential vaccines, insecticide 
treated bednets, and new insecticides), and 
  broader policy settings and regulatory 
factors. 
  To manage IP in this practical and policy environment 
directly to achieve public-interest goals will require a hybrid 
for the IP management skills that applies the same degree of 
rigour and focus that private firms use to leverage in line 
with their corporate objectives, but directed towards explicit 
public-interest goals. Public-private partnerships “must be as 
aggressive in the way they use IP as any commercial unit, 
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objective of getting quality, affordable products to 
developing country patients … [by applying] creative IP 
arrangements that do not scare off companies but also allow 
the PPP enough control to ensure their ultimate objective 
[44].” 
  Consquently, then, public-interest IP management is 
based on a pragmatic conception of: 
•  establishing sufficient public interest guarantees of 
access; 
•  building the optimal blend of public funded and 
private sector research, 
•  providing incentives to secure investment of private 
resources, particularly in product development and 
dissemination capacities when these are not available 
in the public sector; 
•  ensuring sufficient safeguards for investment of these 
resources in the development of a new or adapted 
product development, so that there is a rational basis 
to absorb the inherent risk in this process; 
•  deploying development know-how without unreason-
ably undercutting the legitimate competitiveness of an 
industry partner vis-à-vis its competitors; 
•  and crafting practical partnership structures that are 
defensible to public sector stakeholders and coheren-
tly combine and channel public resources into delive-
ring actual public health outcomes for the defined 
neglected health needs. 
  Choices of exact mechanisms to be deployed will be 
influenced by: 
•  The lengthy time-frame of product development: 
ensuring convincing guarantees of access that will be 
effective over time while being responsive to changed 
circumstances; 
•  A realistic approach to price guarantees: a case by 
case choice between diverse options such as setting a 
specific formulae for particular markets, setting 
pricing standards using general criteria, or not 
requiring specific pricing arrangements, and instead 
defining access safeguards in other ways or relying on 
competition to ensure adequate or reasonable access; 
•  The need for technology access guarantees potentially 
to cover not just project technology, but an entire 
technology package (background IP, test data, 
knowhow, improvements) sufficient to bring a 
sustainable and viable product to the public; 
•  The benefits of continuing technical assistance and a 
comprehensive approach to technology transfer that 
extends beyond simple freedom to operate in a strict 
legal sense and ensures practical support for optimal 
use of the technology. 
CONCLUSION 
  Public-sector IP management functions as a practical 
discipline, and illustrates how in practice to reconcile the 
apparent contradiction between the exercise of exclusive 
rights and the universal right of access to health. It may be 
necessary to harness private sector drug development 
capacity and to apply it in directions that purely commercial 
interests would not favour. This suggests a broader vision of 
the operation of the IP system as a form of national 
knowledge management, directed towards the generation of 
public goods through channeling private interests, in a more 
targeted way than a simple laissez faire approach. The 
exclusive rights conferred by IP enable private sector 
resources to be deployed to meet neglected public health 
objectives: the ‘lure of gain’ condemned by Pindar is to 
Lincoln the ‘fuel of interest.’ 
  Exclusivity, judiciously employed, can translate into 
positive control over technologies so as to serve the public 
interest directly – thus it arises, perhaps counterintuitively, 
that public health advocates could welcome the grant of a 
BRCA patent to what is technically a private company (a 
cancer research charity), while opposing a similar patent held 
by public entities – because the license granted under the 
privately-held patent provided a guarantee that access to the 
covered technology would not be rationed by capacity to 
pay; meanwhile, the management of publicly-held 
technologies was criticized for excessive use of the leverage 
available through exclusive rights to provide the fuel of 
interest, argued to be to the detriment of the broader public 
welfare. In short, the public interest, and the practical 
attainment of a right to health, may flow at least as much 
from the manner in which IP rights are exercised, across a 
wide spectrum of practical options, as from the formal scope 
and contours of the IP system conceived as a body of law 
and the expression of a balancing of interests by the 
legislature. The emerging discipline of public interest IP 
management is assuming critical importance as the level and 
breadth of public ownership of IP rise steadily, just as 
steadily as the growth in public concern and public 
expectation that their concrete interests will be served by the 
just and effective management of these knowledge resources. 
  It would be facile to suggest that a traditional conception 
of two distinct public and private spheres in public health 
innovation is breaking down, if it could ever be coherently 
identified. It is more accurate to characterize public-private 
interaction as in a state of rapid evolution towards greater 
diversity, the scope of interaction broadening to 
accommodate far greater geographical, cultural, and 
economic diversity in the use of the patent system. Workable 
mechanisms for bringing new biomedical innovations to the 
public may require (1) a range of strategic choices to engage 
or eschew market mechanisms to various degrees in order to 
secure the necessary resources and freedom to operate, rather 
than plumping for a wholly “public” or “private” technology 
development and dissemination model, and (2) deployment 
of exclusive rights across a spectrum of greater or lesser 
degrees of exclusivity and openness, ranging from direct 
exclusive exploitation or exclusive licensing, through a range 
of options of decreasing exclusivity, to simple public-domain 
disclosure. It seems counterintuitive, but some public sector 
technology-development strategies may require strong 
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private sector compound library or when negotiating access 
to an existing regulatory dossier. Equally, private sector 
players can see commercial advantage in deploying 
nonexclusive IP management structures, particularly for 
precompetitive technologies.
37 Public sector programs may 
avoid patent coverage for research tools such as cell lines, 
with a view to facilitating wide application while still using 
contractual control over access to physical materials to 
secure financial returns to fund further research.
38 No single 
template is likely to be anything but an indicative guide or 
catalog of options. Ultimately, from a utilitarian perspective, 
what amounts to good practice in advancing desired public 
health outcomes is good policy. But what is clear is that the 
same exclusive right will be viewed very differently if it is 
held by a private firm, by a public sector agency, or by a 
private charity, and depending on how it is deployed in 
practice. The choice to seek or to grant patent protection is 
not in itself determinative of the public welfare outcomes: 
much depends on how the exclusive rights are exercised, 
where, by whom and to what end; and on what institutional 
policies and on what strategic objectives define and guide IP 
management choices. 
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